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Abstract
Interests continue to grow in recent years for the
adoption of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in
many different areas including transportation and
supply chain management. Those RFID-included
objects can be targeted more efficiently by real-time
tracking and instant management. However, because
of the contact-less type of RFID remote retrieval, the
transmission of data in the air is very vulnerable to
eavesdropping or appropriation. A primary security
concern surrounding RFID technology is the illicit
tracking of consumer location and analyzing of their
shopping habits or behavior.
This paper proposes a more secure and
lightweight RFID variation protection protocol which
enhances the security of the transmission of
information as well as the consumer privacy protection
by using randomized control access and two-way
identification. In addition, this protocol also improves
the overall performance and lowers the cost of RFID
tag without any complicated calculation.
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1. Introduction
RFID is an automatic identification method, relying on
storing and remotely retrieving data using RFID tags.
RFID system may consist of several components:
RFID tags, RFID readers, edge servers, middleware,
and application software. An RFID tag is a small
device contain silicon chips and antennas that can be
attached to or incorporated into any object. Passive
tags require no internal power source, whereas active
tags require a power source [3, 8].
Because of the contact-less type of RFID remote
retrieval, the transmission of data in the air is very
vulnerable to eavesdropping or appropriation. In
addition, unique means of identification in each RFID
tag such as Electronic Product Code (EPC) [5] allows
easy tracking of the movement of persons and goods.
Moreover, even if the responses of tags are encrypted,

the owner can also be identified and tracked by the
fixed encrypted code [6].
It is expected that RFID system will carve a place
for itself and become widespread in all areas. It will
have a great impact on the way we work and live [12].
However, the excessive use of RFID readers can also
turn into closely connected monitoring networks that
collect all kinds of information including tracking of
the movement of goods as well as identifying and
analyzing personal information [1, 9 and 10]. For the
long-term growth of RFID system, it is critical that the
system can provide a mechanism which will address
the issues of personal privacy, security, and identity
theft.

2. Related works
There have been some approaches to the security and
privacy issues in RFID system. The approaches can be
classified into four categories.
Disable tags totally or partially
To protect consumer privacy, checkout clerks would
“kill” the tags of purchased goods before they are
placed in the hands of consumers; no purchased goods
would contain active RFID tags [2, 4 and 10].
But it is difficult to ensure that the kill command
was properly executed. In addition, partially disable or
rewrite tag can not prevent being tracked as tags
respond to a fixed output.
Blocker tags
The RSA Blocker Tag technology uses a jamming
system designed to confuse RFID readers and prevent
those devices from tracking data on individuals or
goods outside certain boundaries [10]. It cannot be
used, for example, to circumvent theft-control systems
or mount denial-of-service (DoS) attacks – only to
protect the privacy of law-abiding consumers.
But this kind of solution, only may achieve in the
limited safeguard for consumers. It needs consumer's
initial cooperation and voluntary purchase of the
equipment. In other words, they do not deal
thoroughly with the problems of security and privacy.

Fig. 1: Dirk’s Hash-based ID variation protocol procedure [7]

Hash Lock
With Hash lock, tags only respond to authorized
readers. Fixed hash lock stands for an authentication
process in which the authentication key is fixed. This
scheme offers privacy control at a low cost. All it
requires is a hash function and storage for RFID tag’s
ID. Every reference to RFID tag data was stored in
back-end database [4, 11 and 13].
However, it can not prevent being tracked,
because tags respond predictably.
Randomized Hash Lock
Randomized Hash Lock is an extension of hash lock
type scheme which uses random number function.
Instead of fixed metal ID, RFID tag’s response
changes with each query. This prevents illegal RFID
readers to locate the consumer’s position through the
fixed value of RFID tag [6, 7 and 13].
Among those solutions deploying the Randomized
Hash Lock approach, the Hash-based ID variation
protocol proposed by Dirk is most popular, as shown
in Figure 1.

3. LCID variation
The Randomized Hash Lock approach provides better
protection against the security and privacy problems
among the four solutions discussed earlier. However,
the high complexity of computation and procedures is
not suitable for the low-cost RFID implementation.
This study proposes a more secure and lightweight
RFID variation protection protocol which is the
Low-Cost Identification variation (LCID variation)
protocol, to resolve this issue.

3.1. Initial Setup
The size of storing the capacity is one of the important
factors to influence the RFID tag cost. Therefore, the
objective of this study is to design a protection

mechanism that reduces the amount of data fields
contained in RFID tags and so the cost can be reduced.
The necessary field of LCID variation protocol is
defined as follows:
Each RFID tag needs to contain fields for the
following entries:
- RFID tag’s ID (“ID”)
read only
- RFID reader’s ID (“RID”)
read only, optionally writable
- Additional fields for user data or a master key
are conceivable but not required at all
Each RFID reader needs to contain fields for the
following entries:
- RFID reader’s ID (“RID”)
read only
- Random number (“RND”)
read / write
The DB needs to contain a table with the following
entries for each record row:
- RFID tag’s ID (“ID”), acting as primary index
of the table
- A reference to tag data / user data (“DATA”)
read / write
Each RFID reader has an unique reader
identification (RID), and each RFID tag stores an
authorized RID to measure the target of
communication. RID is used to prevent illegal RFID
readers collecting data illegally to analyze consumer’s
shopping habits. RND is a random number to protect
all of transmission of data and to prevent replay attack.
When the RFID tag is embedded into the product
and shipped, the data in database should be written
into the RFID tag containing related product records
for further access and queries.

Fig. 2: Low-Cost ID variation protocol procedure

3.2. Normal Operation
There are five steps in the low-cost dynamic RFID
security protocol. Figure 2 depicts the brief flow.
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

RFID reader generates a random number RND,
and sends a query (RID⊕RND) to RFID tag.
RFID tag performs a XOR manipulation on the
received (RID⊕RND) and its authorized RID;
thus achieves the original RND. And then, it
returns the value ID ⊕ (RND+1) to the RFID
reader.
RFID reader performs a XOR manipulation on
the received ID⊕(RND+1) and its (RND+1); thus
obtains the original ID. And then, it uses the ID
the query the back-end system.
According the above ID, the back-end system
accesses the related product information from the
database, and returns to RFID reader. In this stage,
the ordinary procedure is completed.
This step happens only when the RFID reader
requests re-authorization. In this situation, RFID
reader uses the New_RID (new reader
identification) to compute the (New_RID)⊕RID
⊕(RND+2), and sends the value to RFID tag.
When RFID tag receives the message, it
sequentially performs a XOR manipulation on the
received (New_RID) ⊕ RID ⊕ (RND+2), its
(RND+2), and RID. The result obtained is the
newly authorized New_RID. The RFID tag can
overwrite the old RID by the obtained New_RID,
and completes the re-authorization procedure.

4. Analysis for LCID variation
In the following, the LCID variation and Hash-based
ID variation are compared briefly:
Identification: each RFID tag gets an authorized
“RID” which can access the RFID reader data. Thus,
RID can protect the data transmitted by RFID tags
from being read by unauthorized RFID readers. In
addition, fake tags cannot obtain RID, and IDs to

compute the RNDs which is used to discriminate a real
tag. Therefore, the RFID tag and reader can
discriminate each others and achieve the “Two-way
identification”. On the other hands, the Hash-Based ID
variation protocol only provides “One-way
identification” for RFID tags; it cannot discriminate
the reality of a RFID reader.
Security: The RFID reader randomly generates a
RND number at each communication. RND can be
used to protect transmitted data, ensure the
communication privacy, and avoid replay attacks. On
the other hand, Hash-Based ID variation protocol
deploys one-way hashing to protect the transmitted
data with higher computation complexity and data
loading.
Privacy: Employing random numbers makes the data
transmitted by RFID tags get a non-fixed value that is
unpredictable, and thus can protect the consumer’s
location from being traced. On the other hand,
Hash-Based ID variation changes the RFID tag
identification code after each data access.
EPC compatibility: The RFID tag contains a fixed
identification number; which is compatible with EPC
network. The product related information could be
queried via ONS in EPC network. Hash-based ID
variation changes the RFID tag identification code
after each data access, and thus is not compatible with
EPC network that uses single ID number.
Communication performance: This work (LCID
variation) simplifies the communication flows and
data transmission. There are two types of reading
flows in LCID variation protocol: (1) In the ordinary
flow, only four times of message passing are needed.
(2) In case there is a need to be re-authorized, it takes
five times of message passing. In both types, only one
single data should be transmitted at each step.
Therefore, it retains good performance in the
environment where considerable RFID tags access the
network simultaneously. On the other side, Hash-based
ID variation always takes five times of message
passing, and multiple packets of data are sent out in

each message passing. Obviously, this protocol can
bring down the overall performance.
Cost: There are two significant cost components for
the RFID tag: the computation ability and storage
space. These two components are simplified in our
security protection mechanism. Because LCID
variation deploys only the less-complicated XOR
computation, the RFID tag does not need complicated
computation capabilities and storage spaces. On the
other hand, the RFID tag must handle multiple hashing
functions and XOR computation in Hash-based ID
variation. In addition, it must store both the old and
current record, and thus increases the space demand by
two folds.
Table 1 describes the above analysis.
Table 1: Comparative and analysis

Hash-based Low-Cost ID
ID Variation Variation
Identification
Data
Performance

One-way

Two-way

Security

Yes

Yes

Privacy

Yes

Yes

EPC compatibility

No

Yes

Procedure

Complex

Simple

Calculate

Complex

Simple

DB record

2 Records

1 Record

Yes

Better

Expand capability

5. Conclusion
In recent years, the RFID has been widely adopted in
many different fields at an increasing rate. Yet, the
issues of security and privacy have become the key
challenges in promoting the RFID technology. Each of
the existing four categories of solutions has its merits
and pitfalls. The objective of this research is to
propose a secured and lightweight protection protocol
to resolve these issues.
This research proposes a low-cost dynamic RFID
security protocol, which deploys a randomized
protection and two-way identification mechanism.
This protocol can provide better protection for data
transmission and consumer privacy. In addition, the
protocol has an advantage in terms of data
transmission performance over other protocols as it
does not require encryption technology. Moreover, the
protocol lowers the RFID tag costs and is compatible
with the existing EPC network. This research
demonstrates a new and effective low-cost RFID

protocol that can be implemented and introduced to a
consumer market that operates in high security
environments.
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